2. The "quest for meaning" in 20th linguistics

A theory is only as good as the principles of description to which it gives rise

(Bernstein 1996a: 93)

... linguistic theory is no substitute for descriptive insights

(Halliday 2003g: 39)

(a) Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that a linguistics for the study of ideology must have meaning as its central focus. It must also accept that ideology is pervasive in language, because language 'construes' - shapes - reality. While it may be a comfort to some scholars, such as Lakoff and Fairclough (Fairclough 2010c; Lakoff 1987) to believe that it is possible to step outside of ideology, the theoretical consequences of this position are untenable (see Chapter 8). To believe that language is only sometimes ideological is to propose that language can both shape and, at the same time, merely mirror reality. But when linguists argue that language mirrors reality, they are seeing it simply as a code which directly corresponds to (or deviates from) some supposedly independent reality, either material or mental, against which some particular use of language can be judged as 'true' or 'untrue'. When language is treated as "code" - that is, as simply nomenclature for things and ideas that already exist - "the resulting vision is so impoverished that serious questions about language can hardly even be raised, let alone imaginatively pursued" (Halliday 2003b: 237).

Linguistic theories are themselves ideologies, ideologies about the nature of language. They offer varying conceptions about the nature of language: what it is, how it works, and how it relates to human experience of the world. The differences between linguistic theories on the relations of language to "reality" are, I suggest, defining: that is, these differences on this question produce ideologies about language which are difficult to reconcile. This means linguistic theories vary in their capacity to explain the pervasiveness and power of ideology, and in their usefulness for describing specific ideologies. Halliday, as noted in the previous chapter, is part of a tradition of linguistics in which meaning is central to explaining the structure and organisation of language. Within this tradition, language is always ideological, a principle that is part of the make-up of language. Halliday is further explicit about the ideological nature of linguistic theory, including his own, describing the key influences on his
theory as his "ideological antecedents". These antecedents, he argues, are
not in the formal grammars and truth-conditional semantics of the latter part of the cen-
tury, but in a more functionally-oriented linguistics: that of Sapir and Whorf, Malinows-
ki and Firth, Bühler, Mathesius and Trubetzkoy, Hjelmslev, Benveniste and Martinet,
among many others (Halliday 2003d: 423)

Since Halliday's architecture of language is central to developing a robust, appliable
model of ideology, then it is imperative to understand the key ideas that have informed the
development of his linguistic theory. This chapter provides an overview of a selection of key
thinkers and key concepts which are essential to understanding Halliday's conception of
language. I consider the work of Vološinov, Saussure, Malinowski, Firth, Whorf and
Bernstein, reading them in particular to see how their influence on Halliday is relevant to
developing a systemic functional concept of ideology. I argue that their ideas about language
help us understand why language is so powerful, and, by extension, why ideology depends on
language. In the following chapter, I turn to the work of Halliday and Hasan in relation to
developing a socio-semiotic account of ideology.

Vološinov gives to linguistics the first semiotic account of ideology, and emphasises
the interpenetration of language, ideology and consciousness. From Saussure, I explore two
key features of the linguistic sign: its arbitrariness and linearity. These principles are
fundamental to the nature of language, and therefore must be relevant to understanding
language's ideological power. Malinowski concepts of context of situation and context of
culture (particular as conceptualized in the later work of Halliday and Hasan) help us relate
ideology as it is manifest in an instance to the culture and social forms which explain it. But
in addition, ideology is powerful because it is deeply connected to human ways of living.
Malinowski helps us understand these connections. Firth puts meaning at the centre of
linguistics. He argues that meaning is made at all levels of the linguistic system. He develops
a contextual theory, and introduces the concept of 'restricted languages', which becomes the
notion of 'register' in Halliday's theory. He also emphasises the role of collocation and
colligation in how words accumulate meanings. From Whorf, Halliday takes the notion that
language has an experiential function, which enables speakers to construe experience.
Whorf's idea of grammar having deep or 'cryptotypic' meanings is also important to
understanding ideology, since part of the power of ideology is that it can be invisible. Finally,
I briefly explain the key concepts in Bernstein's work which have been central to developing
a theory of 'semantic variation', particularly in Hasan's work. Bernstein's sociology is
focussed on the role of discourse in the reproduction of culture, but with a particular focus on
class. I explain his concepts of 'power' and 'control', and 'classification' and 'framing', and
finally, the notion of 'code'. I discuss these particular concepts further in Chapter 3, when I explore Hasan's work on ideology, which is based very much in Bernstein's work.

(b) Volosinov (1895-1936)

Volosinov brought to the human sciences the first semiotic account of ideology (Eagleton 1991: 194). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language was first published in 1929, with a second edition appearing one year later. This second edition was translated and published in English in 1973 (Matejka & Titunik 1973). For Volosinov, ideology and language are entirely interpenetrating. This point is a constant theme in the work. He writes, for instance, that

Without signs, there is no ideology ... The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too. Everything ideological possesses semiotic value (Volosinov 1973: 9, 10),

and that "The word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence" (Volosinov 1973: 13). For Volosinov every sign, "even the sign of individuality" is social (Volosinov 1973: 34).

Volosinov emphasizes the importance of the ubiquity of language to its ideological function. This ubiquity, he argues, ensures the word is socially and ideologically saturated:

The word is implicated in literally each and every act or contact between people – in collaboration on the job, in ideological exchanges, in the chance contacts of ordinary life, in political relationships, and so on. Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social intercourse register effect in the word. It stands to reason, then, that the word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularised and fully defined ideological systems. The word is a medium in which occur the slow qualitative accretions of those changes which have not yet achieved a status of a new ideological quality, not yet produced a new and fully-fledged ideological form. The word has the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change. (Volosinov 1973: 19).

Like Saussure, Volosinov sees the sign as psycho-social, with the social being primary with respect to the content of the sign5. But Volosinov more directly theorizes the relation of the sign, ideology and consciousness, with an unambiguous stance in relation to these relations. He emphasizes, again and again, the social basis of individual consciousness. He argued that "signs can arise only on inter-individual territory", and that "individual consciousness not only cannot be used to explain anything, but, on the contrary is itself in need of explanation for the vantage point of the social, ideological medium" (Volosinov 1973: 12). Thus "consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material
embodiment of signs ... understanding is a response to a sign with signs" (Vološinov 1973: 11), and "the only possible objective definition of consciousness is a sociological one" (Vološinov 1973: 13). In taking this position, Vološinov actively rejects psychological accounts of consciousness where they begin with the subject's inner subjectivity as the origin of consciousness. Any kind of "methodological precedence of psychology over ideology" is, he argues, "untenable" (Vološinov 1973: 27). The conscious psyche is "a socioideological fact" (Vološinov 1973: 25).

Yet Vološinov gives a clear role to the individual psyche in the formation of an individual's consciousness.

To understand means to refer a particular inner sign to a unity consisting of other inner signs, to perceive it in the context of a particular psyche ... Between the psyche and ideology there exists, then, a continuous dialectical interplay: the psyche effaces itself, or is obliterated, in the process of becoming ideology, and ideology effaces itself in the process of becoming the psyche. The inner sign must free itself from its absorption by the psychic context ... must cease being a subjective experience, in order to become an ideological sign. The ideological sign must immerse itself in the element of inner, subjective signs; it must ring with subjective tones in order to remain a living sign and not be relegated to the honorary status of an incomprehensible museum piece ... The psyche and ideology dialectally interpenetrate in the unitary and objective process of social intercourse (Vološinov 1973: 35, 39, 41).

Thus, the formation of the psyche depends on ideology, and the continuation of ideology depends on it having a locus in individual minds. This view is echoed in his distinctions between "established systems of ideology" and "behavioural ideology", defined as "atmosphere of unsystematized and unfixed inner and outer speech which endows our every instance of behaviour and action and our every "conscious" state with meaning" (Vološinov 1973: 91). These two scales of ideology, one established and pervasive, the other individualistic and volatile, are in constant interaction. While the established systems, such as social ethics, science, art, and religion are "crystallisations of behavioural ideology" these crystallisations "exert a powerful influence back on behavioural ideology and draw sustenance from it". Without such contact, the established forms "would be dead" (Vološinov 1973: 91). "Behavioural ideology" draws the established forms into "some particular social situation". A particular ideology is thus "interpreted in the spirit of the particular content of consciousness (the consciousness of the perceiver) and is illuminated by it anew. This is what constitutes the vitality of an ideological production" (Vološinov 1973: 91). This account of ideology by Vološinov shows not only that one can, but that one must, reconcile a systemic perspective on ideology as patterns in a culture, with the instantiation of ideology via instances of particular ideologies as they permeates one specific situation and interaction.
Vološinov also gives a central place to the notion of what Malinowski calls, around the same time, the "context of situation" and the "context of culture" (see for a critique of the limitations of the Vološinov/Bahktin view on social situation and social milieu). Vološinov, like later systemic linguistics, argues that the immediate and wider social context provide the "organizing centre" for any utterance, that the sign and its social situation are inextricably fused together (Vološinov 1973: 37):

Utterance as such is wholly a product of social interaction, both of the immediate sort as determined by the circumstances of the discourse, and of the more general kind, as determined by the whole aggregate of conditions under which any given community of speakers operates. (Vološinov 1973: 93).

Indeed he felt that "linguistic thinking has hopelessly lost any sense of the verbal whole" (Vološinov 1973: 110), a problem he suggested, that it had left to other disciplines such as rhetoric and poetics. European linguistic thought, he argued, "formed and matured over concern with the cadavers of written language" (Vološinov 1973: 71). Vološinov argued that linguistics needed to make "the structure of a whole utterance" its object of study (cf Malinowski and Firth below). While "the utterance in its wholeness remains terra incognita for the linguist", the discipline would remain unable to be a genuine and concrete science (Vološinov 1973: 110).

(c) Saussure (1857-1913)

The impact of Saussure’s theory on linguistics is such that "modern linguists and their theories have since been positioned by reference to him: they are known as pre-Saussurean, Saussurean, anti-Saussurean, post-Saussurean, or non-Saussurean (c.f. Firth 1957: 179)" (Hasan 2014). While his work has been central to the development of linguistics and semiotics, the key concepts in his work have not been properly understood or explored by linguists concerned with explaining the inter-relations of language and ideology. If Saussure's model of sign relations is so central to the study of meaning, it must surely be relevant to understanding the ideological power of language. Saussure identified two key features of the sign's make-up: its arbitrariness and its linearity, both of which are key features in the ideological nature of language. The arbitrariness of the sign is a principle which, Saussure wrote, "no one disputes", the consequences of which "are numberless" and which "dominates all the linguistics of language" (de Saussure 1974: 68). "Arbitrary", Saussure wrote, does not mean "the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker". In fact, "the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community" (de Saussure 1974: 69). For Saussure, arbitrary means "that it is
unmotivated ... that it actually has no natural connection with the signified" (de Saussure 1974: 69). While the sign is a unit of two parts, Saussure emphasises that the sign takes shape through the coming together of these two halves. When separate, the sign does not exist. There is "no such thing as a form and a corresponding idea; nor any such thing as a meaning and a corresponding sign" (de Saussure 2006: 24); to consider the sign as a "the union of a certain sound with a certain concept" Saussure argues, "is grossly misleading" because "its content is really fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it" (de Saussure 1974: 113, 115).

One implication of this theory of sign is that thought cannot precede language. Saussure argued that thought without language is "a vague, uncharted nebula" and that "... there are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language" (de Saussure 1974: 112). At the same time, the arbitrariness of the sign gives language the plasticity that is crucial to its ideological power. As Halliday argues, the fact that "the two facets of the (original) sign need bear no iconic resemblance to each other" - bestows on language the potential of "indefinitely extending the range of 'meanable' things" (Halliday 2003e: 14). Language is, therefore, freed from the contraints of "the ‘real’ world of objects or the ‘mental’ world of thoughts and ideas" (Hasan 2014). It is this feature of language which enables it to construe abstract or invisible phenomena, and to create imaginary worlds.

There is a further significant consequence of this arbitrariness: the arbitrary nature of the sign ensures it is "the social fact alone" which can create a linguistic system (de Saussure 1974: 113). To quote Saussure:

The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are to be set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value" (de Saussure 1974: 113).

In drawing attention to this consequence of the arbitrariness of the sign, Hasan emphasizes the crucial role of "parole" in reinforcing the association between the signifier and signified. Through use, these bonds are both sustained, and subject to change over time. By requiring communal endorsement and use, signs are closely tied to a community's preoccupations and *modus vivendi*, at the same time that signs bind communities together. For an arbitrary system to work, there must be collective, if unconscious agreement, about the relations of form and meaning. Human communities and societies have enjoyed the freedoms that the arbitrary nature of the sign bestows, the freedom to shape a semiotic system, unconsciously, and simply by virtue of using language for living. At the same time, they are bound to and by the system that their collective use of meaning creates.
What about the principle of linearity? In a syntagm, a word acquires value because "it stands in opposition to everything that precedes or follows it, or to both" (de Saussure 1974: 123). A reflex of this linguistic fact is that a definition of a word almost invariably requires, and is always best supported by, being placed within a syntagm. Many words can only be understood by reference to the discourse around them. The requirement of the syntagm creates relations "formed inside discourse". The laying out of syntagmatic structure puts words into complex grammatical relations, bestowing on a given element the status, for instance, of Subject versus Complement, Actor versus Goal, Theme versus Rheme. Moreover, given the metafunctional complexity of language - another potential the arbitrariness opened up - the syntagm bestows on structure, simultaneously, meanings of all these kinds. Halliday has suggested that it is, in particular, the workings of choices associated with the textual function that opens the system to ideological manifestations, a point I will discuss further in the next chapter.

Saussure contrasts these relations - those "formed inside discourse" via syntagmatic relations - to those formed "outside discourse". These relations, named by Saussure as "associative relations" are seated in the brain, and depend of some kind of similarity. They are "part of the inner storehouse that makes up the language of each speaker", uniting "terms in absentia in a potential mnemonic series" (de Saussure 1974: 123). These relations can be via the "formal scatter", i.e. relations which derive from the shared base ("educate, educates, education"), by reiteration of some morphology ("education, frustration, dictation"); or by relations that derive from associations around the signifier. These relations include, for instance, collocation, synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, and meronomy (Halliday & Hasan 1976). Thus, "a particular word is like the center of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of an indefinite number of co-ordinated terms" (de Saussure 1974: 126).

On the coming together of these two Saussurrean axes - the syntagmatic and the associative - Hasan writes:

Because each sign in a syntagm carries both its syntagmatic ‘in praesentia’ relations and also the penumbra of its associative ‘in absentia’ relations, the acculturated brain familiar with the speech conventions of the community readily identifies a given sign as a particular sign, different from all the others, and yet similar in behaviour to some of them. These two relations represent the major modes of the sign’s interplay (Hasan 2014).

The systemic nature of signs is a counterbalance to the principle of arbitrariness (Hasan 2014). This fact of language allows parole to put its stamp on the system, and the system, by logical extension, to carry a community's experience, and to exert that experience back on the individual use. The system is therefore open to innovation - news ways of
meaning - at the same time that it exerts a pressure towards continuity, and therefore, to the reiteration of existing patterns of meaning. This pressure is one further property of the linguistic system that makes it efficacious for the reproduction of ideologies, at the same time that language remains an open dynamic system, available to reshape existing ideologies, or construe entirely new forms of meaning.

(d) Malinowski (1884-1942)

Ideology appears to have an almost magical power - the power, as Eagleton wrote, to make humans mistake each other, from time to time, for gods or vermin (Eagleton 1991: 7). Malinowsksi wrote about the magical power of language, not simply in its recruitment to the performance of sacred or mystical functions, but the everyday magical power of language. In assigning such power to language, Malinowski began by rejecting as "dangerous" the view that language was a "countersign to thought".

Words - and even more so, perhaps, phrases, sentences and texts - taken in conjunction with other types of behaviour, constitute extremely significant documents and commentaries. But there is nothing more dangerous than to imagine that language is a process running parallel and exactly corresponding to mental process, and that the function of language is to reflect or to duplicate the mental reality of man in a secondary flow of verbal equivalents (Malinowski 1935: 7 emphasis added).

He argued instead that language is a form of action (a concept that influenced the notion of the "interpersonal function" in Halliday's theory). Words for Malinowski "do, act, produce and achieve" and must be studied not in their "purely intellectual function" but as "an instrument of action" (Malinowski 1935: 52). Malinowski defined meaning as "the effect of words on human minds and bodies and, through these, on the environmental reality as created or conceived in a given culture" (Malinowski 1935: 52). He argued that all communities treat certain words as "creative acts":

You utter a vow or forge a signature and you may find yourself bound for life to a monastery, a woman (sic) or a prison. You utter another word and you make millions happy, as when the Holy Father blesses the faithful. Human beings will bank everything, risk their lives and substance, undertake a war or embark on a perilous expedition, because a few words have been uttered. The words may be the silly speech of a modern 'leader' or prime minister; or a sacramental formula, an indiscreet remark wounding 'national honour', or an ultimatum. But in each case words are equally powerful and fateful causes of action ... (Malinowski 1935: 52)

For Malinowski, the "imaginary and mental effects are as important in the realm of the supernatural as the legal effects of a formula are in a contractual phrase". Meaning exerts a "creative binding force"; with "an inevitable cogency" an utterance is able to produce
particular effects such as conveying a permanent blessing, or inflicting irreparable harm, or saddling one with a longlife obligation (Malinowski 1935: 52-54). Malinowski argued that from this point of view, there was no strict demarcation between the signature of the cheque, a civil contract of marriage, or the use of fictitious excrement to repel bush-pigs. All such acts required the support of an existing set of cultural arrangements, certain beliefs, attitudes, moral and legal sanctions. Malinowskki argued that this dynamism of words was particularly pronounced in some environments. He described "two peaks of pragmatic power". One involved the sacred and magical uses of language, as in magical formulae, exorcisms, curses and blessings, sacramental utterances, and prayers. These utterances had a creative effect because they "set[] in motion some supernatural power (Malinowski 1935: 52). A second peak of dynamism involved the pragmatic function:

An order given in battle, an instruction issue by the master of a sailing ship, a cry for help, are as powerful in modifying the course of events as any other bodily act ... (Malinowski 1935: 52)

This deep connection between language and living led Malinowski to argue that the structure of language reflected the functions to which it was put, a concept that became "metafunction" for Halliday. In addition, Malinowski emphasized that meaning was a function of both the context of situation - the immediate environment for the unfolding of an interaction - as well as the broader context of culture. The utterance "belongs to a special context of culture" at the same time time, there is the "situation in which the words have been uttered" (Malinowski 1935: 51). In Chapter 3 I explore the particular place of these concepts in Halliday's theory, and their importance to understanding the relationship of language to ideology.

(e) J.R. Firth (1890-1960)

In this section, I outline the key ideas from Firth that must be understood in relation to our central problem: why is language essential to ideology, and inseparable from it? Firth's ideas are crucial, and provide a deep foundation for the later theorising of meaning that comes in the work of Halliday and Hasan. An obvious starting point is that ideology is a pattern of meaning, and Firth's linguistics were central to establishing the study of meaning as the brief of "abstract linguistics" (Firth 1968c: 24). Linguistics without meaning, a strand in the discipline that was beginning to take hold in America during Firth's career, was, in his view "sterile" (Firth 1968b: 160). Indeed, Firth urged that linguistics "at all levels" was "concerned with meaningful human behaviour in society" (Firth 1968b: 160). In this vein,
Firth asserted the need for linguistics to focus its attention on the "patterns and processes of living".

"My own approach has always been based on an acceptance of the whole man (sic) in his patterns of living. ... The linguist has to reject most of these patterns, confining himself to the processes and patterns of life in which language 'text' is the central feature and operative force ... The linguist, in accepting the whole man in his cultural context, must ... assume that normal linguistic behaviour as a whole is meaningful effort, directed towards the maintenance of appropriate patterns of life" (Firth 1957e: 225)

At a time when American linguists were exploring how to exclude meaning from formal linguistic studies, Firth was developing a theoretical architecture to explore "how much meaning can be legitimately be included" on the basis that "meaning must be included as a fundamental assumption" (Firth 1968f: 50). In the process of developing an architecture for the study of meaning, Firth made a number of important theoretical statements. He argued that meaning was the product of patterns at every level of the linguistic system. He talked of "modes of meaning", and the contributions to meaning made by all forms of linguistic patterning, from sound and grammatical patterns to the features of the contextual matrix, understood in Malinowski's terms to mean both the immediate context of situation, and that same situation seen from the perspective of its place within a wider cultural context. A statement of meaning, therefore, "cannot be achieved in one fell swoop by one analysis at one level" (Firth 1957f: 192). Once the linguist has made "the first abstraction by suitably isolating a piece of 'text' or part of the social process of speaking for a listener or or writing for a reader", Firth's suggested method was to attend to the dimensions of meaning with regards to its dispersion into modes, rather like the dispersion of light of mixed wave-lengths into a spectrum" (Firth 1957f: 192). The analysis of a text requires "multiple statements of meaning, at various levels of analysis" (Firth 1968a: 108).

There are two key points, both theoretical and methodological, to be observed in the fashion in which Firth made meaning the focus of linguistics. The first is the notion of "contextualization" as meaning-making process. No linguistic sound, form or structure can mean unless some process of contextualization is in train. The levels of language, in Firth's view, all exert a form of contextualization, from sound all to way to the contexts of situation and of culture. Culture exerts its assumptions, its history, its myths right into the centre of human interaction. Thus, a given context will have "a place in what may be called the context of culture" (Firth 1957d: 32). A second key point is that a syntagm on any level can only be theorized and described when it is understood systemically. In this respect, Firth, though critical of Saussure's dichotomies (language and parole, synchrony and diacrony - see e.g. (Firth 1957a)), brought a Saussurean sense of system and "valeur" to his theory of the nature of
structure. Firth emphasised, again and again, that the meaning of a structure was not only a function of its syntagm, but of the systems which pertained to its structure. Language to Firth was not only systemic, it was "polysystemic".

While many linguists construct or recruit dichotomies - form and content, thought and word, nature and nurture etc - Firth was avowedly "monistic" in this thinking (see e.g. (Firth 1957d: 19) (Firth 1957f: 192)). A central consequence of this view for an account of language and ideology is that Firth everywhere saw continuities, not boundaries. He argued, explicitly, that in linguistics "we do not separate nature from nurture" (Firth 1964: 89). Language was continuous and interwoven in our bodies at the same time that language was part and parcel of every part of our experience. In Firth's words, language is:

embedded in the matrix of living experience and the human body as the primary field of human expression and as continuous with the situations of life. Indeed, if we are fussily exact, we cannot define where the body begins and where what we erroneously call external nature ends. (Firth 1968d: 90-91)

In each instance of interaction, Firth saw the past, present and future:

There is the element of habit, custom, tradition, the element of the past, and the element of innovation, of the moment, in which the future is being born. When you speak you fuse these elements in verbal creation, the outcome of your language and of your personality (Firth 1957a: 184).

As already suggested, the study of ideology and its import takes as given the idea that meanings are flows of currents between the outside and the inside. As Firth has put it, "we are in the world and the world is in us" (Firth 1957b: 29), and all of our linguistic behaviour is best understood when

it is seen as a network of relations between people, things and events, showing structures and systems, just as we notice in all our experience. The body itself is a set of structures and systems and the world in which we maintain life is also structural and systematic. This network of structures and systems we must abstract from the mush of general goings-on which, at first sight, may appear to be a chaos of flux (Firth 1968d: 90).

Meaning, then, is part of all features of language, of all its "systems and structures". It is construed, for Firth, both in via the "interior relations" of the language system, and in the "external relations" between the structures and systems in a language, and the structures and systems of the situations in which language functions (Firth 1968d: 90). The task of analysing meaning involves statements on all levels, and with regards to both the interior and exterior relations. Linguistics involves, therefore, the relating of meaning to the matrix of experience within which that meaning is meaningful. This view prompted Firth to make statements about the structures and systems of the context of situation, and various brief sketches of his conception of context are available in his writings, ideas later elaborated by
Halliday and Hasan. Crucially, Firth's conception of context was a theoretical abstraction, made with due regard for the principle that any theoretical innovation would be tested against its capacity to throw light on the phenomena that constituted its object of study. Firth consistently highlighted the need for the discipline to develop its theoretical tools, without losing sight of the richly human nature of human language. In his contextual construct, he drew on Whitehead's notion of "prehension". Thus, he argued that the context of situation:

is a 'patterned process conceived as a complex activity with internal relations between its various factors'. These terms or factors are not merely seen in relation to one another. They actively take one another into relation, or mutually 'prehend' one another as Whitehead would say. Even within the language system itself what is said by one man (sic) in a conversation prehends what the other man has said before and will say afterwards. It even prehends negatively everything that was not said but might have been said. This inter-related prehensiveness' must be taken as a fundamental principle even in phonetics and formal grammar (Firth 1964: 110-111).

Firth gives to linguistics the idea of a language text tightly woven with choices on many scales sensitive to what has gone before in the unfolding interaction, and to the configuration of the matrix of experience of which the language forms part. It was language form on this scale to which, Firth argued, linguists should turn their attention. He used the term "restricted languages" (Firth 1968d; Firth 1968a) to mean the language specialized to some context of situation, with its own "micro-grammar" and "micro-glossary" (Firth 1968a: 106). A restricted language - what later became "register" in Halliday's theory - is "limited by its use and its micro-glossary may be rich and its micro-grammar specialized" (Firth 1968a: 111). With regards to the many restricted languages which constitute human interactions, Firth used various metaphors, for instance, of language as a "sort of social switchboard which commands the power grid of the driving forces of the society" (Firth 1964: 113). Like Vološinov, Firth saw the ubiquity of language, and considered this feature to be part of what made language such a dominant force in the lives of humans. Speech is meaningful because of "the combined personal and social forces it can mobilize" (Firth 1964: 113). Within the many and varied ends which language both serves and shapes, Firth, in an echo of Malinowski, argued some are more powerful than others. The "power and magic" of language, he argues, is at its apogee "when it mobilizes either our own most primitive feelings or gives us such command of the forces of nature as the triumphs of science" (Firth 1964: 113). Around "war", language both mobilizes these primitive feelings, and celebrates the technological "achievements" that define the war-machine in a given age (Bourke 2015).

This kind of claim suggests that some "restricted languages" may be more significant and important in the study of ideology. But Hasan argues (see below) that for an ideology to gain traction, it requires affirmation over many forms of social activity. In Firth's terms, this
means that ideology must be able to be continuous across an array of "restricted languages" (see Lukin forthcoming). A key theoretical issue is the observation from Firth of the pervasiveness of language, and its inseparability from forms of living. Language is for Firth (as for Vološinov) ubiquitous. Its ubiquity has two dimensions: it is ubiquitous "horizontally", i.e. across most contexts of living. He argued that:

The force and cogency of most language behaviour derives from the firm grip it has on the ever-recurrent typical situations in the life of social groups, and the normal social behaviour of the human animals living together in those groups. Speech is the telephone network, the nervous system of our society much more than the vehicle for the lyrical outbursts of the individual soul. It is a network of bonds and obligations (Firth 1964: 113).

Speech is also ubiquitous "vertically", that is, in relation to all periods in the life of humans. Language is, for Firth, a central medium of socialization. As Firth notes:

the young human has to be progressively incorporated into a social organisation and the main condition of that incorporation is sharing the local magic - that is, the language"(Firth 1957c: 185).

Finally, Firth's work is crucial to the study of ideology for his concept of "collocation". Firth described his concept of collocation as:

the study of key-words, pivotal words, leading words, by presenting them in the company they usually keep - that is to say, an element of their meaning is indicated when their habitual word accompaniments are shown (Firth 1968a: 106-107).

Collocation is not "mere juxtaposition", but is rather "an order of mutual expectancy". The words are mutually expectant and mutually prehended. (Firth 1957b: 12); they are "found in 'set' company and find their places in the 'ordered' collocations. Collocations are "actual words in habitual company. A word in a usual collocation stares you in the face just as it is" (Firth 1957b: 14). The idea of "keyword", in typical collocational patterns, which display the active force of "prehension", help us understand how established ideologies get themselves on a kind of "autopilot" (Firth 1957b). Firth argued that words must not be treated as if "they had isolate meaning and occurred and could be used in free distribution"; rather, a "multiplicity of systems derived from carefully contextualized structures would seem to be indicated" (Firth 1968c: 18). Firth's ideas on collocation have influenced the development of corpus linguistics, especially in Britain, and have been applied to various ideological problems (see e.g. (McEnery 2006))
(f) B.L. Whorf (1897-1941)

Whorf's account of language confirms some key ideas of previous scholars I have discussed. He is, like Saussure, Vološinov and Firth, a linguist concerned with meaning, a kind of orientation crucial to a linguistics for the study of ideology. Whorf describes language as "an especially cohesive aggregate of cultural phenomena" (Whorf 1956i: 65), through which "raw experience" can be organized into "a consistent, readily communicable universe of ideas through the medium of linguistic patterns" (Whorf 1956b: 102). Whorf's contribution is manifold. Language must be able to mean covertly, and Whorf helps us understand this dimension of language, not only with respect to his claims about the deep relations between language, thought and reality, but, more specifically, his notion of "cryptotype". I argued in the previous chapter that an ideology, even one fraught with contradictions, has to come to us in some kind of tightly woven, interlocking fashion. Again, Whorf is important in this regard. There is, for instance, his conception of a "configurative rapport", a kind of logic of a language through which "fashions of speaking" come to hold together. It is a central concept for explaining how "innumerable small momenta" come to give us semantic grooves which we trace and retrace in our interactions with others. Whorf argues that the logic of two languages can be almost irreconcilably different, so that the words of one cannot quite get across the meanings of another, especially those made by the cryptotypic patterns of the other language.

In the previous chapter, Whorf was identified as a linguist for whom language and ideology are inseparable. Like other scholars to whom I have attributed this view, Whorf does not make this claim in these terms, though he comes close to it in his paper "Science and Linguistics" (Whorf 1956i). But Whorf is clear on the matter that language provides for its speakers a worldview (see also (Levinson 2012)) through habits of linguistic patterning. Entailed in language, Whorf argued, is a metaphysics through which speakers of a language must refract much of their experience. Whorf was clear that language was not the sole determinant of a person's sense of their world; for a start, language was only one part, and not the whole of culture. In addition, his sense of mind, taken from Jung, included aspects which he saw as non-linguistic. He argued, for instance, that "feeling is mainly nonlinguistic, though it may use the vehicle of language, albeit in a different way from thinking" (Whorf 1956l: 66). But Whorf argued forcefully that language set the terms of thinking, and that it was able to do so in such a fashion that its speakers would come to see their linguistically shaped sense of the world as simply the way of the world. In making his case, Whorf contributed to linguistic theory some crucial notions pertaining to both grammar and meaning. For instance,
he distinguished linguistic categories as 'phenotypes' or 'cryptotypes', terms he used to articulate the idea of overt and covert structures and semantic patterns in language. A phenotype is a structure with obvious morphological exponence, that is, categories in which a "formal mark" is almost always indicated, such as the category of plural in English. By contrast, languages also display grammatical categories which are cryptotypic. Such categories can only be elucidated via their "reactances", that is, via their behaviour under special conditions which brings the category into view, at least to the specialist. A cryptotype construes a "submerged, subtle, and elusive meaning, corresponding to no actual word, yet shown by linguistic analysis to be functionally important in the grammar" (Whorf 1956l: 71). For English, Whorf gives examples such as the transitive/intransitive distinction, gender, and adjectival distinctions between qualities which are inherent and non-inherent (and which take a different order when they premodify). Whorf argues that for many languages, linguistic meaning is in the interplay of both phenotypes and cryptotypes (Whorf 1956l: 72). In these claims, Whorf gives us a view of grammar as a shaper of meaning, as a shaper of mind or world view, and as a metaphysics which operates on a largely unconscious basis.

It is not difficult to see how this view of grammatical structure is essential to an understanding of how language is so deeply implicated in ideological formations. At the same time, there is a further piece of Whorf's conceptual architecture that is relevant: the notion of "configurative rapport". In a letter to a colleague in psychology in 1927, Whorf appeared to be already searching for a name for the concept which would become "configurative rapport". In his letter, he explained the need for a term to describe the idea of meanings which, covertly, connect various words or ideas together:

The very existence of such a common stock of conceptions, possibly possessing a yet unstudied arrangement of its own, does not yet seem to be greatly appreciated; yet to me it seems to be a necessary concomitant of the communicability of ideas by language (Whorf 1956h: 36)

It is more a concept of continuity, with the ideas as relative locations in a continuous medium (Whorf 1956h: 38)

In seeing the coherence creating function of language, Whorf searched for some notion to describe how collections of words and patterns came together in a configurative manner, to set the terms of what speakers would see as the logic of life. In part this orientation in Whorf's linguistics came out of an interest in Gestalt psychology. He suggested

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12. Whorf attributes to the French linguist Fabre d'Olivet (1768-1825) the origins of ideas about "rapport-systems, covert classes, cryptotypes, psycholinguistic patterning, and language as part and parcel of culture" (Whorf 1956l: 74).
in an essay "On Psychology" that Gestalt psychology had discovered "the importance of configurations in the mental domain". But the fuller understanding of this part of our mental experience required the tools of linguistics. He argued:

when we attempt to apply the configurative principle to the understanding of human life, we immediately strike the cultural and the linguistic (part of the cultural) especially the latter, as the great field par excellence of the configurative on the human level (Whorf 1956g: 41).

As such, he argued, that with regards to linguistic and mental phenomena:

significant behaviour ... are (sic) ruled by a specific system or organization, a "geometry" of form principles characteristic of each language. This organization is imposed from outside the narrow circle of the personal consciousness, making of that consciousness a mere puppet whose linguistic manoeuvrings are held in unsensed and unbreakable bonds of patterns (Whorf 1956d: 257).

The "higher mind" was, he concluded, systematic and configurative in nature. As a consequence, the "patternment" feature of language dominated the "lexation" or "name-giving aspect". Therefore, "the meanings of specific words are less important than we fondly fancy"; in fact they are "at the mercy of the sentences and grammatical patterns in which they occur" (Whorf 1956d: 258, 259). Hasan noted in a paper first published in 1986 that Whorf's emphasis of a "configurative rapport' provided a basis for indicating which linguistic patterns are relevant to the construction of which ideology (Hasan 2005e: 272). Whorf explains this principle below:

Logic is now what holds it together, and its logic becomes a semantic associate of that unity of which the CONFIGURATIVE aspect is a bundle of non-motor linkages mooring the whole fleet of words to their common reactance. Semantically it has become a deep persuasion of a principle behind phenomena, like the ideas of inanimation, of "substance", of abstract sex, of abstract personality, of force, of causation - not the overt concept (lexation) corresponding to the word causation but the covert idea, the "sensing", or, as it is often called (but wrongly, according to Jung), the "feeling" that there must be a principle of causation (Whorf 1956l: 81).

Whorf turned his account of configurative rapport back onto his own mother tongue. Speakers of English, or of "Standard Average European" (Whorf 1956k) are, he argued, inclined towards a certain way of seeing that is correlated with the deep patterns and habits of our linguistic system. He termed this configurative rapport a motif of "objectification", and a "general objectification tendency" (Whorf 1956k: 144), arguing that English terms "persuade us to regard some elusive aspect of nature's endless variety as a distinct THING, almost like a table or chair" (Whorf 1956f: 240); that the "English technique of talking depends on the contrast of two artificial classes, substantives and verbs, and on the bipartitioned ideology of nature" (Whorf 1956f: 242). The grammars of SAE enable, even require its speakers to "read into nature fictitious acting-entities simply because our sentence patterns require our verbs,
when not imperative, to have substantives before them" (Whorf 1956d: 263). The power of this pattern is such that Whorf considers it worthy of the term "microcosm". In the SAE microcosm, reality is analyzed largely in terms of "things" (both "bodies" and "quasibodies"). In addition, this microcosm sees in reality "modes of extensional and formless existence that which are known as "substances" or "matter". With his knowledge of a language so fundamentally distinct from SAE languages, Whorf argues that by contrast, the Hopi microcosm is oriented to reality as process or event (Whorf 1956k: 147).

In attributing such power to linguistic patterns, Whorf is anxious to clarify that the construction of "habitual thought" is more than simply the work of these patterns themselves. These patterns have an "analogical and suggestive value"; and between language and culture there is considerable give-and-take. In this process each person develops inside themselves his or her own "thought world", which Whorf argued was an individual's microcosm through which a person "measures and understands what he (sic) can of the macrocosm" (Whorf 1956k: 147). In this process, we "unknowingly project the linguistic patterns of a particular type of language upon the universe, and SEE them there, rendered visible on the very face of nature" (Whorf 1956d: 263).

(g) Bernstein (1924-2000)

I turn now to the work of British sociologist, whose work has been oriented to producing a sociolinguistic account of cultural reproduction. For Bernstein, cultural reproduction is the means by which class societies perpetuate their unequal distribution of resources. Bernstein locates this work in a neo-Marxist tradition, e.g. in relation to scholars such as Gramsci and Althusser13. His work also draws on Bourdieu and Foucault14. But he argues that despite these various scholars' interest in the link between ideology and consciousness, there is an "inadequate specification of the relation between the discourses, social relations, division of labour, and transmission systems which create the relation between ideology and consciousness" (Bernstein 1990c: 134). Bernstein's work is an attempt to bridge this gap, so that "we can understand the way in which knowledge systems become

13. Bernstein writes "it is worth pointing out that the theory of ideology I have found the most congenial, in the sense of resonating with the problems addressed, is that of Althusser: the imaginary subject" (Bernstein 1996a: 128).

14. See (Diaz, 1984) for an account of the relations between Bernstein and Foucault. On the relations to Bourdieu, see (Bernstein 1990a).
part of consciousness" (Bernstein 1996e: 17).

Underpinning all of Bernstein's work is an analytical distinction between "power" and "control", a distinction which is "crucial and fundamental to the whole analysis" (Bernstein 1996d: 19). Bernstein argues that power relations create, legitimise and reproduce boundaries between different categories of groups (by gender, class and race), different categories of discourse, and different categories of agents. Power produces "dislocations" and "punctuations in social space". It establishes legitimate relations of order by maintaining category insulation - by keeping things apart. Thus, in Bernstein's model, power operates on the relations between boundaries. Categories are "created, maintained, reproduced, and legitimated by insulation maintenance" (Bernstein 1990b: 24) and argues that "the insulation maintainers must have power and the conditions to exert it" (Bernstein 1990b: 24). "Power" is distinguished from "control", which establishes the forms of communication which legitimate the category distinctions. Thus, control reproduces power relations by socialising individuals into the insulations of a given arrangement of power relations. Bernstein notes that while control is the mechanism for maintaining an existing distribution of power, it is at the same time the means by which a given distribution of power can be challenged. Control is "double faced" (Bernstein 1996d: 19).

The relay - the means - for the reproduction of power relations is referred to by Bernstein as "pedagogic discourse". Bernstein describes pedagogic discourse as "a uniquely human device for both the reproduction and the production of culture" (Bernstein 1990e: 64). It is the means of transmission - and so is produced by "transmitters" - and to greater and lesser degrees construes the subjectivity of "acquirers". Though he proposes this "transmission-acquisition" model, Bernstein indicates throughout his writing that this is not a deterministic process. The system has inside it the potential for disruption and change. At the same time, Bernstein suggests that power is a hierarchical, asymmetrical dynamic (for discussion, see (Diaz, 1984), especially chapter 13).

Via the mechanics of pedagogic discourse, power and control are translated into lived experience. Two further concepts are necessary to understanding these mechanics: classification and framing. These concepts underpin Bernstein's account of how symbolic

15. In this account of cultural reproduction, Bernstein has a number of influences, including Sapir, Whorf, Firth, Hymes, Halliday, Durkheim, Weber, Mead, Malinowski, Vygotsky, Luria. See e.g. (Bernstein 1971a).

16. Bernstein originally took the term "classification" from Durkheim, though he redefined it. The concept of "framing" derives from "symbolic interactionism" (Bernstein 1996a: 101).
control regulates different modalities of pedagogic discourse. These modalities specialise forms of consciousness and distribute them via forms of communication which relay a given distribution of power. While the term "classification" is widely used to mean an attribute that distinguishes a category, Bernstein uses the term to distinguish attributes of the relations between categories. This is because Bernstein treats the identity of a category as a function of how strongly or weakly it is distinguished from other categories sufficiently similar to it. Thus:

"A can only be A if it can effectively insulate itself from B. In this sense, there is no A if there is no relationship between A and something else. The meaning of A is only understandable in relation to other categories in the set; in fact, to all categories in the set. In other words, it is the insulation between the categories of discourse which maintains the principles of their social division of labour" (Bernstein 1996d: 20).

Classification values can be weak or strong. Where they are strong, a category has "its unique identity, its unique voice, its own specialised rules of internal relations". Where it is weak, we find less specialised discourses, identities, and voices. Whether strong or weak, classifications always carry power relations (Bernstein 1996d: 21). "Classification" is a psycho-social principle for Bernstein. It is mode for the organisation of power relations external to the individual, with the function of regulating relations between individuals. In this process "insulation faces outwards to social order". It marks the arbitrary nature of power relations, construing them as natural, and creating identities that come to be seen "as real, as authentic, as integral, as the source of integrity" (Bernstein 1996d: 21). Since these relations are arbitrary the "contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas" which are inherent in them must be suppressed. At the same time, classification is a principle of psychic order internal to the individual, through which it creates a "system of psychic defences against the possibility of weakening of the insulation, which would then reveal the suppressed contradictions, cleavages and dilemmas" (Bernstein 1996d: 21). These psychic defences are not necessarily conscious (Bernstein 1996d: 26). The psycho-social nature of the concept is important: it is what enables Bernstein to bring together ideology and consciousness.

Framing is the central means for the enactment of control. While classification establishes the principles of order, framing manages their reproduction. It constitutes "the controls on communication in local, interactional pedagogic relations" (Bernstein 1996d: 26). While classification establishes the voice and how it is recognized, framing is the process by which subjects acquire the legitimate message. Framing is concerned with how meanings

See also (Bernstein 1971b).
are to be put together; it regulates the "realization rules" for legitimate forms of communication. Thus it regulates relations between "transmitters" and "acquirers" to attempt to ensure the continuity of a given distribution of power. Like classification, framing can be weak or strong. Where framing is strong, pedagogic practices are visible; where framing is weak, we find invisible pedagogic practices. For Bernstein, the subject is "a dialectical relation between 'voice' and message" (Bernstein 1990b: 27).

There is one final critical concept for our discussion of Bernstein: the notion of "code". Pedagogic discourse establishes patterns or "modalities". This is, in a sense, Bernstein's take on Whorf's notion of "fashions of speaking". Underpinning the reproduction of class relations, Bernstein argues, are dominant and dominated forms of communication and consciousness. Pedagogic discourse is the means for the relay of these class-regulated forms of communication. From the perspective of class, Bernstein argues that class reproduces itself through the production and unequal distribution of coding orientations, which function as positioning devices. A code, he argues is

... a regulative principle, tacitly acquired, which selects and integrates:

(a) relevant meanings
(b) forms of their realisation
(c) evoking contexts

meanings
realisations
contexts (Bernstein 1990b: 14)

Code is an "underlying semantic ... considered to be the regulator of specific linguistic realisations" (Bernstein 1990b: 14). Code is what happens to linguistic choices when the social structure exerts its considerable weight on the processes of socialisation, so that a certain way of distributing a community's resources can be maintained. Codes regulates relations between contexts, and through those relations, it regulates relations within contexts. Codes produce "recognition rules", the means of recognizing some set of "goings-on" as this or that context of situation; and they generate "realisation rules", the patterns through which a certain kind of context is enacted. Code "regulates the what and how of meanings" (Bernstein 1990b: 32). At the level of the individual, codes mediate the emergence of an individual's sense of themselves in the world, by positioning them "with respect to dominant and dominated forms of communication and to the relationships between them" (Bernstein 1990b: 13). And in and through this code-mediated positioning of subjects, "ideology is constituted".

Coding orientation is internalised. Bernstein argues that it is through specific linguistic codes that "relevance is created, experience given a particular form, and social identity constrained" (Bernstein 1971a: 125). Coding orientation provides "recognition
rules", i.e. the principles by which a kind of social action is identified as having a certain character. It is the basis for how one recognises a context to have the social meaning that it has, to some section of a community. Coding orientation also generates "realisation rules", the principles for the generation of legitimate messages, messages that resonate with the model of context, what the context is taken to be a context for. In his account of the reproduction of class relations, Bernstein has postulated two distinct coding orientations, known as the "restricted" and the "elaborated" code. For Bernstein, codes are distinguished by virtue of their relations to a "material base". The "restricted code" is an orientation towards local space, time and context. The restricted code is closer to a material base. The elaborated code, by contrast, goes beyond local orientations. It has a more indirect and less specific relation to a material base. While both codes produce abstraction, the elaborated code relates "an everyday world to a transcendental world" (Bernstein 1996f: 44). Thus, the semantic principle of the elaborated code creates and unites two worlds. With this indirect relation to a specific material base, there is a discursive gap. Bernstein suggests this gap can become:

- a site for alternative possibilities, for alternative realizations of the relation between the material and the immaterial. The gap itself can change the relation between the material and the immaterial. This potential gap or space I will suggest is the site for the unthinkable, this site can clearly be both beneficial and dangerous at the same time. This gap is the meeting point of order an disorder, of coherence and incoherence. It is the crucial site of the yet to be thought" (Bernstein 1996f: 44)

The concept of code in Bernstein's work is a semantic principle which regulates linguistic realisations. Codes are the means by which relevant meanings are selected and integrated. They presuppose a concept of legitimate and illegitimate forms of realization, and so presuppose "a hierarchy in forms of communications and in their demarcation and criteria" (Bernstein 1990d: 102). Finally, Berstein argues that the origins of the elaborated code lie with the agencies of symbolic control (Bernstein 1990d: 111). Moreover, these agencies specialise in producing specific discourses predicated on the semantic principles of elaborated codes (Bernstein 1990b: 22). These codes are

- the media for thinking the 'unthinkable', the 'impossible' because the meanings they give rise to go beyond local space, time and context. A potential for such meanings is disorder, incoherence, a new order, a new coherence' (Bernstein 1996b: 158).

**(h) Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed a selection of key scholars whose ideas provided impetus to the development of Halliday's linguistic model. Their ideas have not previously been discussed as concepts relevant to understanding the relation of language to ideology. But
from this work, a number of key features of language which help explain its ideological potential are apparent. In the next chapter, I discuss the concept of ideology in the work of Halliday and Hasan.